The Economics of Despair :: essays research papers

Since the tardy 1970s, social science researchers, the media, private foundations, and policymakers have directed considerable trouble to the labor market problems of young adults and their families. Most of this attention has focused on high return aim snitchouts, the poor, minorities, and inner-city youth. But an equally troublingand broaderproblem has authoritative comparatively less notice the steep and sustained decline since 1973 in the received (inflation-adjusted) earnings of young work force and women generally. Even adjusting for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, the labor market problems of young workers are disproportionately severethey allow higher than average unemployment and relatively low earnings when employed. This sustained drop in earnings has been especially dramatic for young adults with no postsecondary school education. Most proposed remedies have emphasized the quality of the labor supply. But astir(p) education and training, while oft en worthwhile and necessary, is not by itself qualified to raise earnings. If this downward trend, which has persisted through recession and recovery alike, is to be reversed, because policymakers and educators must address the demand side as well as the supply side. Raising young adult prosecutes will contain not only better academic performance, training, apprenticeships, and school-to-work programs, but also just-employment policies, changes in the configuration of jobs and careers, and larger young adult union membership. Prior to 1973, the one-year and weekly earnings of both young adults and older workers had been improving markedly. amidst 1967 (the year the Bureau of Labor Statistics began tracking weekly earnings of wage and salary workers) and 1973, the real median weekly earnings of 16- to 24-year-olds rose by approx i mately 8 percent. Since 1973, however, the earnings of young adults have fallen some continuously. Between 1973 and 1979, the weekly earnings of yo ung men working full time fell by 7 percent. Young men experienced a 19 percent decline in earnings (a real value of $72 per week) between 1979 and 1989. This decline cannot be attributed solely to wrinkle cycle contractions. About half of the 19 percent decline did take place during the recessionary completion of 1979-1982. But between 1982 and 1989, a period of strong overall job growth, the weekly earnings of young men fell by another $33, or 9 percent. Earnings declined unperturbed more between 1989 and 1994, dropping yet another 9 percent. The upshot of all this decline? A young man under 25 years of age employed full time in 1994 bring in 31 percent less per week than what his same-aged counterpart earned in 1973.